By Dr. Ken Broda Bahm:
9-11 wasn’t really a terrorist attack, the President isn’t really an American citizen, and climate science is an elaborate hoax. Or, that is at least what a surprising number of Americans believe. Respond to any of these conspiracy theories with reasons or evidence, and you’ll get something like, “Yeah, that is what they want you to believe…and the fact that you and so many other sheep believe it shows just how deep and effective the cover-up has been.” It doesn’t take long to get frustrated with the circularity of it. But before we simply dismiss these as the ravings of the tin foil hat crowd, it is important for anyone involved in persuading the public — and that includes litigators — to understand that the roots of these conspiratorial views can be traced back to a mindset, perhaps even a basic personality dimension, that extends far beyond the lunatic fringes. It is a worldview that may even be sitting in your jury box.
A recent study (Wood & Douglas, 2013) takes a look at the nature of the conspiracist mindset, and contrasts it with it’s opposite, a conventionalist mindset, through an analysis of thousands of online discussion comments. The researchers found that the conspiracists were motivated more by the goal of tearing down the official explanation than they were by the goal of offering or supporting an explanation of their own. Apart from the extremes of political views, this points to a tendency we often see in real and mock jurors: Some seem especially prone to reject the “official” story, even when they aren’t sure they know what happened instead. Whether that “official” version is offered by the government or by a large institution, there will be a certain number of individuals who are primed to be skeptical and to search for flaws in any version of events offered by those in authority. This post takes a look at the study and what it says about addressing the conspiracists as well as the conventionalists in your jury.
The Study: Conspiracy Theory is More About Destroying Official Narratives than Constructing Its Own
Michael Wood and Karen Douglas (2013), both of the University of Kent in the U.K. begin with a definition of conspiracy theories as “allegations that powerful people or organizations are plotting together in secret to achieve sinister ends through deception of the public.” That is a definition that could apply to more than a few plaintiffs’ theories as well. To test the hypothesis that conspiracy theories depend more on discrediting or tearing down the account offered by official sources than on buttressing their own less common accounts, Wood and Douglas analyzed 2,174 online comments relating to a number of articles published in the U.S. and the U.K. on the ten-year anniversary of the 9-11 terror attacks. The comments in response to articles in ABC News, CNN, The Independent, and The Daily Mail websites were alternately defenses of or reactions to the so-called “9-11 Truth Movement” holding that the attacks were in some way staged by the government in order to justify subsequent wars and civil liberties restrictions.
Interestingly, the conspiracist comments were more than twice as prevalent as their conventionalist counterparts defending the common understanding of 9-11. Comparing the two groups of commenters, the researchers found that the conventionalists were more likely to contain information that supported their own position (51 percent of conventionalists compared to 31 percent of conspiracists), while conspiracist comments were more likely to simply derogate or challenge that common understanding instead of supporting their own (64 percent of conspiracists compared to 44 percent of conventionalists). That is consistent with other research referenced in the article (Wood, Douglas & Dutton, 2012) showing that beliefs in even contradictory conspiracy theories will correlate with each other. This suggests that the conspiracist mindset bears more on the tendency to disbelieve the official story than on the likelihood of believing any one alternative view.
The Implication: Adapt to Attitudes Toward Official Narratives
In trial, there is often a parallel conflict between the story coming down from official sources and its alternatives. In criminal cases, of course, the official story is the one coming from the government. In civil cases involving private parties, there are still narratives coming from authority: powerful industries, large companies, government regulators. Given that there seems to be some psychological tendency for individuals to either trust or distrust that official view, it makes sense for litigators to adapt to its presence.
Consider the Mindset
Ask yourself, “what would a conspiracist see in my case?” and “How would a conventionalist view the stories?” This distinction is a useful addition to a litigator’s working understanding of the different kinds of jurors and the psychological habits they bring to the case. Some jurors might be motivated to go with whatever appears to be a consensus opinion, while others will engage a process of motivated reasoning geared toward finding inconsistencies and chinks in the armor. This analysis of the conspiracist mindset is also a reminder that a gap in evidence can be seen as evidence in itself, and any kind of problem in the official story buttresses the belief that something else must have happened. “For many conspiracists, there are two worlds.” Wood and Douglas write,” one real and (mostly) unseen, the other a sinister illusion meant to cover up the truth; and the evidence against the latter is evidence of the former.”
Mind the Label
Litigators, particularly on the defense side but not exclusively, may sometimes be in the position of arguing against a conspiracy theory. In that event, it helps to call it something other than that. The Wood and Douglas study found, unsurprisingly, that “neither conspiracists nor conventionalists were particularly willing to self-apply the term ‘conspiracy theory’ or its derivatives.” That is because, even though it might literally be a theory that holds the existence of a conspiracy, the label “conspiracy theory” has come to be closely associated with paranoia and mental illness. Calling it out in that manner might yield the agreement of the conventionalists, but will only lead to defensiveness from the conspiracists and the ones on the fence you are trying to persuade.
Buttress the Official Story
You may not reach all the conspiracists, but it helps to try. And the research even shows that you may have a chance, as long as you acknowledge and adapt to the source of the skepticism. I’ve written before about research coming from the Yale Cultural Cognition Project showing that conspiracy theorists can be converted by appeals that specifically adopt to the frames that they’re thinking within. Those believing that climate change thesis is a hoax, for example, could be at least partially persuaded by appeals that adapt a pro-industry frame, arguing that there are capitalist advantages to green energy products. For advocates in trial, this might mean providing evidence to suggest the conspiracy view is wrong, but in a way that still fits the conspiracist’s mindset. For example, the company actually did comply with the industry standards, not because it wanted to do the right thing, but because their profit motive pushed them in that direction.
Naturally, there is no guarantee this will save the official explanation. But it can help. There is a tendency to believe that those firmly committed to a conspiracy view can never be swayed to a different view…but perhaps that is just what they want you to believe.
______
Other Posts on Juror Skepticism:
- Adapt Your Scientific Testimony to Jurors’ Skeptical Ears
- Teach the Difference Between Science and Junk
- Convert Your Conspiracy Theorists: Research Shows it Can Be Done
______
Wood MJ, & Douglas KM (2013). “What about building 7?” A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theories. Frontiers in psychology, 4 PMID: 23847577
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and Alive Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(6), 767-773.
Photo Credit: cam_rich345, Flickr Creative Commons